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CHALLENGING NONBANK SIFI
DESIGNATIONS: GE, METLIFE, AND THE
NEED FOR REFORM
ABSTRACT
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
created, among other things, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), an entity within the U.S. Department of the Treasury tasked with
assessing and mitigating financial risk. Financial institutions with over $50
billion in assets are automatically deemed “systemically important.”
However, under the Dodd-Frank Act, FSOC has the authority to designate
non-bank companies engaged in financial activity as systemically important
as well. Once designated as a systemically important financial institution
(SIFI), these companies are subject to enhanced regulation and supervision
by the Federal Reserve. Because the costs associated with such enhanced
regulation are significant, most companies do not actively welcome a SIFI
label. In 2016, two of the four non-bank SIFIs (GE Capital and MetLife, Inc.)
had their SIFI labels rescinded. GE was able to shed its SIFI label by
minimizing the size of its assets and operations. MetLife chose to challenge
FSOC’s designation in federal district court. This Note reviews the available
methods for challenging SIFI designations and proposes alternative methods
to increase fairness in these challenges, including amending FSOC’s
evidentiary hearing procedures to more closely resemble federal court
proceedings, and creating an internal appeals process within the U.S.
Department of the Treasury as an alternative to bringing suit in district court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the financial crisis the United States experienced in 2008,
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act1 (Dodd-Frank), which made numerous changes to the U.S.
financial markets, the regulation of these markets, and the regulation of
market participants. One of the regulatory bodies created by Dodd-Frank is
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which is tasked with
assessing potential risks to the U.S.’s financial stability.2 In assessing and
attempting to mitigate risk, FSOC has the authority under Dodd-Frank to
designate certain nonbank financial entities as “systemically important,” and
these systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are subject to
enhanced regulatory requirements and Federal Reserve (the Fed)
supervision.3

1. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
2. Dodd-Frank § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
3. Id. § 113.
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MetLife, one of the three current nonbank SIFIs, challenged their SIFI
designation against FSOC in the District Court for the District of Columbia
in 2016.4 The District Court found that FSOC’s MetLife determination was
arbitrary and capricious, and that FSOC had contradicted standards it had
previously set forth in its final rule and interpretive guidance regarding SIFI
designations.5 This Note assesses the implications that MetLife’s judicial
challenge presents for other nonbank SIFIs, considers the need for change in
FSOC’s designation process, and evaluates the need for change in the
available methods for challenging SIFI designations. This Note argues that
FSOC’s evidentiary hearing procedures should be amended to create a fairer
forum for challenging SIFI designations and should be governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).6 Further, Congress should create an
internal appeals process within the U.S. Department of the Treasury for
challenging FSOC’s SIFI designations, as an alternative to bringing suit in
federal district court.
Part II of this Note provides background information on FSOC, SIFIs,
and the SIFI designation process. Part III discusses the available methods for
challenging a SIFI designation and reviews how some of those methods have
been employed by existing and previously designated SIFIs. Part IV
discusses MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council,7 in which
MetLife sued FSOC in federal district court to rescind its SIFI label. Part V
argues the need for change in the current process for challenging designations
and proposes an alternative solution.
II. FSOC, SIFIS, AND THE DESIGNATION PROCESS
In 2010, in response to the financial crisis of the preceding years,
Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, which, among other things, created FSOC.8
With its establishment of FSOC, Congress in Dodd-Frank for the first time
created “accountability for identifying risks and responding to emerging
threats to financial stability.”9 FSOC is comprised of a team of federal
financial regulators, state regulators, and an independent insurance expert
4. See generally MetLife Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C.
2016).
5. See generally Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
6. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012).
7. See generally MetLife Inc., 177 F. Supp. 3d 219.
8. See The Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Financial Stability Board: Issues in
International Regulation: Hearing on “The Growth of Financial Regulation and its Impact on
International Competitiveness” Before the H. Fin. Serv. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
113th Cong. 1 (2014) (statement of Peter J. Wallison, Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Financial Policy
Studies, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research) [hereinafter Hearing on Growth
of Financial Regulation].
9. About FSOC, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter About FSOC] (last updated
June 23, 2016, 3:55 PM).
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appointed by the President.10 Ten voting members serve on FSOC, as well as
five nonvoting members.11 Voting members include heads of other federal
regulatory agencies, such as the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the
Comptroller of the Currency.12 FSOC’s non-voting members include state
regulators from the banking, insurance, and securities sectors, who serve in
an advisory capacity.13
FSOC has three primary purposes: (1) identifying risks to U.S. financial
stability arising from the activities or financial distress of banks or nonbank
financial companies; (2) promoting market discipline by removing the
expectation for the U.S. government to shield shareholders, creditors, and
counterparties of these companies in the event of failure; and (3) to “respond
to emerging threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system.”14 Ultimately,
FSOC’s goal is to assess risks to the economy and implement regulatory
mechanisms in an effort to mitigate those risks.15 Regulatory methods
employed by FSOC include facilitating information-sharing, data-sharing,
and coordination among regulatory agencies, recommending stricter
standards for large, interconnected firms, and determining whether to break
up firms that pose a “grave threat” to the country’s financial stability.16
For example, FSOC has determined interconnectivity to be a significant
source of economic risk.17 Large institutions can be connected directly,
through exposure in short-term funding, trading, and derivatives activities, or
indirectly, through common exposure to similar assets or funding sources.18
This risk is intensified “when there is insufficient transparency to determine
which entities are connected to each other, or when certain entities are not
subject to robust risk management standards.”19 FSOC therefore requires
financial institutions to make certain disclosures regarding their liquidity and
risk management practices, as well as about their external financing
sources.20 Improving the quality of information available to regulators and to
the public about financial institutions enhances transparency, and therefore,

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT i (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%20Annual
%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 2016 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT].
15. See About FSOC, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2011), https://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 133.
20. Id.
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is expected to reduce some of the risk posed by this interconnectivity.21 The
assumption is that risk is decreased when market participants have adequate
information about the financial products and entities they are doing business
with.22
While FSOC employs a variety of regulatory methods to address and
mitigate financial risk, the most important method, arguably, is designating
bank and nonbank financial entities as SIFIs, thereby subjecting them to
enhanced regulation and supervision by the Fed.23 FSOC has determined
these SIFIs to be so important to the U.S. economy that additional regulation
is required to reduce the likelihood of their failure, and to ensure that if the
company does fail, it does not bring the rest of the U.S. economy down with
it.24
The designation requirements differ for bank SIFIs and nonbank SIFIs. 25
Any bank with over $50 billion in assets is determined to be systemically
important under Dodd-Frank.26 Some of the most prominent bank SIFIs
include JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America.27 As of September 30, 2016,
they each held over $1.5 trillion in U.S.-held assets.28 There is also a SIFI
subclass for Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs),29 and these
entities are held to stricter levels of risk mitigation than traditional U.S.
SIFIs.30 G-SIBs are designated by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS)—an international financial regulator—and are subject
to regulation by both the BCBS and the Fed.31 There are currently thirty-three
bank SIFIs and G-SIBs, with JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup,
and Wells Fargo rounding out the four largest, based on size and amount of
U.S.-held assets.32
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
See Hearing on Growth of Financial Regulation, supra note 8, at 1–2.
See Emily Liner, Understanding SIFIs: What Makes an Institution Systemically Important?,
THIRD WAY (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.thirdway.org/report/understanding-sifis-what-makes-aninstitution-systemically-important.
25. See id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5331 (2012).
26. Liner, supra note 24.
27. See Steve Schaefer, JPMorgan, BofA, Goldman Sachs Among Eight U.S. Banks on Global
Too Big To Fail List, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/steve
schaefer/2011/11/04/jpmorgan-bofa-goldman-sachs-among-eight-u-s-banks-on-global-too-big-tofail-list/#7dce04e94710.
28. See FED. RES. STAT. RELEASE, INSURED U.S.-CHARTERED COMMERCIAL BANKS THAT
HAVE CONSOLIDATED ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE, RANKED BY CONSOLIDATED ASSETS
(2016).
29. See Liner, supra note 24.
30. See FIN. STABILITY BD., 2016 LIST OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (GSIBS) (2016), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016-list-of-global-systemically-importantbanks-G-SIBs.pdf.
31. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE G-SIB ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY – SCORE CALCULATION (2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d296.pdf; see also
Liner, supra note 24.
32. See Liner, supra note 24.
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FSOC is further responsible for designating nonbank SIFIs and
systemically important financial market utilities (FMUs).33 There are
currently eight systemically important FMUs34 and two nonbank SIFIs—
American International Group, Inc. (AIG), and Prudential Financial, Inc.
(Prudential).35 FMUs are responsible for transferring, clearing, and settling
payments, securities, and other financial transactions among or between
financial institutions.36 FMUs are determined to be systemically important if
a failure or disruption to their functioning could create or increase the risk of
liquidity or credit problems across financial institutions or markets, thereby
threatening the stability of the U.S. financial system.37
AIG’s near-failure played a significant role in the 2008 financial crisis—
in fact, some attribute the crisis entirely to AIG’s collapse.38 While there were
many decisions and events that ultimately led up to it, the catastrophic end
result was that AIG lost $99.2 billion and the Fed provided the company with
an $85 billion bailout loan to keep it from going under.39 Arguably, this was
one of the driving factors in Congress’s decision to establish FSOC and grant
it the authority to monitor and continuously assess financial risk.40 One of
FSOC’s purposes is to remove the expectation that these systemically
33. Designations, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx
[hereinafter
Designations] (last updated Jan. 31, 2017, 10:40 AM).
34. The eight current systemically important financial market utilities are: The Clearing House
Payments Company LLC, CLS Bank International, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc., The
Depository Trust Company, Fixed Income Clearing Corporation, Ice Clear Credit LLC, National
Securities Clearing Corporation, and The Options Clearing Corporation. Id.
35. Id. On June 28, 2016, FSOC rescinded GE Capital’s SIFI designation, bringing the number
of nonbank SIFIs down from four to three. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, BASIS FOR
THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION
REGARDING GE CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
designations/Documents/GE%20Capital%20Public%20Rescission%20Basis.pdf [hereinafter GE
CAPITAL HOLDINGS]. Part III of this Note provides information regarding the rescission of GE’s
designation. Also in 2016, MetLife, Inc. challenged its SIFI label in federal district court, and the
District Court rescinded its designation. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177
F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016). See Part IV of this Note for information regarding the MetLife case
and the rescission of MetLife’s SIFI designation.
36. Designated Financial Market Utilities, About, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/designated_fmu_about.htm (last updated Jan. 29,
2015).
37. Designations, supra note 33.
38. While AIG was not the only financial institution to need, and receive a significant amount
of government assistance, people were shocked that a company with about $1 trillion in assets could
allow itself to lose almost $100 billion. There was also controversy over AIG’s bailout by the Fed,
centering around whether the government should be using taxpayer dollars to bail out financial
companies. This remains a topic of much discussion. See Valerie Ross, What Went Wrong at AIG?
Unpacking the Insurance Giant’s Collapse, KELLOGG INSIGHT (Aug. 3, 2015), http://insight.
kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/what-went-wrong-at-aig.
39. Id. at 2.
40. See EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1
(2011), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/crs-r42083.pdf.
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important entities will receive a government bailout if they should fail, the
way AIG did in 2008.41 While this was likely one of Congress’s primary goals
in providing FSOC with the authorities that it did, there are continuing
debates surrounding whether or not FSOC actually eliminates this
expectation.
One journalist argues that FSOC is a dangerous entity and is DoddFrank’s worst creation.42 Since “financial stability” has not been defined in
Dodd-Frank or anywhere else in the U.S. Code, this creates a vague standard
that gives FSOC far too much reach and discretion in its SIFI designations.43
He argues that because the Fed is responsible for supervising these SIFIs, the
Fed will not allow any of these companies to fail, as doing so would imply
that the Fed is incapable of saving them.44 Others have supplied similar ideas,
arguing that the Fed’s enhanced supervision creates a vested interest in these
companies’ wellbeing, thereby making it more likely that the Fed will bail
them out if they should fail.45 Some have also argued that FSOC lacks
transparency, specifically with regard to its designations.46 In early 2015, the
U.S. House Financial Services Committee (House Committee) complained
of “serious deficiencies” in FSOC’s SIFI designation decision-making
process, and requested FSOC provide documents showing how its decisions
are made.47 Later that year, the House Committee held a hearing on the
matter, and accused FSOC of a lack of transparency and responsiveness to
the requests for information made earlier that year.48 The “lack of
transparency” accusation was based largely on the fact that the majority of
FSOC meetings were conducted privately and there were few details or
substantive information provided in the meeting minutes.49 Still, while they
may be relatively vague, FSOC continues to operate under the authorities
provided to it under Dodd-Frank.50
Dodd-Frank expressly provides the authority for FSOC to require
supervision and regulation for the nonbank entities they determine are
systemically important, and the Act sets forth the factors FSOC should
41. See 2016 FSOC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14, at i.
42. See generally Norbert Michel, Dodd-Frank’s Financial Monster Council: The FSOC,

FORBES (Jul. 7, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2014/07/07/doddfranks-financial-monster-council-the-fsoc/#36f8b30c4ffb.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Emerich Gutter, Note, Too-Big-To-Fail and the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 73, 77 (2010).
46. See Ian Katz, Republicans Order Records in New Attack on FSOC Transparency,
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2015, 4:10 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-29/rep
ublicans-demand-records-in-new-attack-on-fsoc-transparency.
47. Id.
48. See House Committee Faults FSOC for “Lack of Transparency” in SIFI Designations, CTR.
FOR STUDY OF FIN. MKT. EVOLUTION (Dec. 10, 2015), http://csfme.org/News/house-committeefaults-fsoc-for-lack-of-transparency-in-sifi-designations.
49. See id.
50. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).
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consider in making these nonbank SIFI designations.51 Dodd-Frank defines
a “U.S. nonbank financial company” as a company that is not a bank holding
company, and is: (1) incorporated or organized under the laws of the United
States or any State, and (2) predominantly engaged in “financial activities.”52
A company is “predominantly engaged in financial activities” if the company
and its subsidiaries’ annual gross revenues from activities that are financial
in nature represent 85% or more of the company’s consolidated gross
revenue, or if the company’s consolidated assets and all of its subsidiaries
related to financial activities represent 85% or more of the company’s
consolidated assets.53 Under Dodd-Frank, the Fed’s Board of Governors is
responsible for establishing the requirements for determining if a company is
predominantly engaged in financial activities.54
In 2012, FSOC published its final rule and interpretive guidance
(Guidance), which describes its process for reviewing nonbank financial
companies for potential designation.55 The Guidance states that there is no
specific formula for making a SIFI designation, but rather that each
determination should be made based on a “company-specific evaluation” and
should take into account the statutory factors set forth in Dodd-Frank, as well
as other information that FSOC deems necessary or relevant.56 Common
factors include the company’s leverage, size, interconnectedness, and
existing regulatory scrutiny.57 For example, in FSOC’s final determination of
AIG as systemically important, FSOC notes that the company’s size and
interconnectedness played a significant role in its designation.58 The report
points out that AIG is the third-largest insurance company in the United
States, underwrites a wide range of insurance products throughout the world,
has over 60,000 employees, and operates across 400 offices in the United
States and 600 offices abroad.59 FSOC considered AIG’s significant amount
of customers (including over 18 million life insurance and retirement product
customers in the U.S.) and the financial distress the company would suffer if

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. § 5311(a)(4)(B).
Id. § 5311(a)(6).
Id. § 5311(b).
See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
56. Id.
57. See Nonbank Designations FAQs, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL [hereinafter Designations FAQs], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/
designations/Pages/nonbank-faq.aspx (last updated Feb 4, 2015).
58. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 5
(2013),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Deter
mination%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter AIG
DESIGNATION].
59. See id. at 2.
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these customers withdrew their accounts early.60 FSOC also points out how
the numerous financial entities exposed to AIG as counterparties and
customers could also face significant losses in the event that AIG were to
suffer significant financial distress.61
There are three stages in the SIFI designation process.62 In Stage One,
FSOC reviews a broad group of nonbank financial companies to determine
which of those will require further evaluation.63 In Stage Two, FSOC
analyzes the potential threat these companies could present to U.S. financial
stability, based on “quantitative and qualitative industry- and companyspecific standards.”64 If FSOC begins an active review of a company during
this stage, it notifies the company and the company’s primary regulator
within thirty days.65 In Stage Three, those companies selected for official
review immediately receive notice that they are being considered for
proposed SIFI designation.66 In addition to continued analysis and evaluation
of the company, FSOC will agree to meet with the company to allow the
company to present any information it deems relevant to FSOC’s
evaluation.67 At the end of Stage 3, FSOC may make a proposed designation
upon an affirmative majority vote of at least two-thirds of its voting
members.68
Dodd-Frank provides that a nonbank company may be designated as a
SIFI if FSOC determines that either of the following could pose a threat to
U.S. financial stability: (1) “material financial distress at the…company;” or
(2) “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix
of the activities of the…company.”69 FSOC provides a written basis for the
final determination of each designated SIFI and these decisions are made
public on FSOC’s website.70 Once designated as systemically important,
Dodd-Frank subjects these corporate entities to “enhanced prudential
standards” and Fed supervision.71
The history surrounding the creation of FSOC and the SIFI designation
process are important in understanding the need for reform in this area. SIFIs
are designated as systemically important because FSOC has reviewed various
aspects of the company, including size, scale, and interconnectedness, and
60. See id. at 6.
61. Id. at 3.
62. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial

Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,637, 21,642 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 21,645.
65. Designations FAQs, supra note 57.
66. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 70 Fed. Reg. at 21,645; see also Designations FAQs, supra note 57.
67. Designations FAQs, supra note 57.
68. Id.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2012).
70. Designations, supra note 33.
71. Id.
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determined that should these companies fail, the U.S. economy will be
significantly damaged as a result. The purpose for the creation of FSOC and
SIFIs was to protect the U.S. economy against another financial crisis like
the one experienced in 2008.72 However, while taking proactive,
precautionary measures is obviously imperative to secure the country’s
economic standing, it needs to be done within reason, and companies
designated as SIFIs should have an appropriate method of challenging those
determinations if they feel that they’ve been designated incorrectly.
III. THE HISTORY OF SIFI DESIGNATION CHALLENGES
While there are obvious benefits to enhanced regulation in the financial
sector, there are substantial costs associated with a SIFI designation. The Fed
is required, under Dodd-Frank, to establish stricter prudential standards for
all nonbank SIFIs.73 This includes conducting annual stress tests to examine
whether companies can assess risk across all of their operations, and
preparing for these tests can cost a company millions of dollars.74 In
preparation for these tests, many banks have had to make significant
investments in risk management, liquidity assessment, monitoring tools, and
in the infrastructure required to support these kinds of systems.75 In 2015,
banks across the world spent about $29 billion on consultants76—a significant
increase from the $16.35 billion spent in 2007.77 Analysts estimate that
financial firms globally will spend $4 billion on stress-test information
technology in 2016 and expect that number to increase by 15% in 2017.78
In 2015, JPMorgan Chase “had about 550 people working solely on the
Fed stress tests, with more than 2,000 employees contributing indirectly.”79
Stress-testing alone has created an entirely new industry related to regulation
and compliance, worth billions of dollars. However, it seems counterintuitive
to have financial institutions spend billions of dollars annually in an attempt
to prove that they are financially stable. As part of its stress test, the Fed
provides a worst-case scenario to the financial institutions, “in which the
72. See MURPHY & BERNIER, supra note 40, at 1.
73. 12 U.S.C. § 5325.
74. See Ryan Tracy, The Short Answer, What You Need to Know About SIFIs, WALL ST. J. (Mar.

30, 2016, 1:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2016/03/30/what-you-need-to-know-about-sifisthe-short-answer/; see also DELOITTE CTR. FOR REGULATORY STRATEGIES, SIFI DESIGNATION
AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NONBANK FINANCIAL COMPANIES 8 (2013) http://fsroundtable.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/SIFI-designation-and-its-potential-impact-on-nonbank-financialcompanies.pdf [hereinafter POTENTIAL IMPACT].
75. See Bryan Yurcan, Lessons Learned from the Fed Stress Tests, FIN. SERVICES
ROUNDTABLE, http://fsroundtable.org/lessons-learned-fed-stress-tests/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
76. Ryan Tracy, Stress Test Inc.: Billions of Dollars, Bank Consultants to Manage Other
Consultants, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2016, 2:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/stress-test-incbillions-of-dollars-consultants-to-manage-other-consultants-1467139620.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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unemployment rate doubles, stock prices plunge by half, and interest rates
turn negative.”80 The Fed doesn’t provide exactly how it will calculate the
companies’ losses, in an effort to prevent them from “gaming the exercise.”81
Critics of the stress tests provide that the tests’ simulations do not fully
capture the extent of how the company would be affected in a real economic
crisis.82 If the stress tests do not adequately reflect the impact of such a
setback, yet cause companies to expend millions of dollars to prove that they
can withstand a significant economic setback, the tests seem to be doing more
harm than good.83
In addition to annual stress tests, Fed supervision includes additional
reporting requirements in an effort to improve transparency.84 This presents
challenges for nonbank SIFIs, as nonbank financial companies typically have
diverse business models with different risk drivers, which may not fit neatly
into a uniform reporting framework the way traditional financial institutions
do.85 These companies are also required to maintain a certain amount of
capital, limit their credit exposure, manage liquidity risk, comply with debtto-equity ratio requirements, and create a “living will” to assist the company
in winding down, should it fail.86 Nonbank SIFIs may also need to limit
expansion or dispose of assets, and may be prohibited from participating in
“systemically risky” activities.87 For example, a nonbank SIFI will not be
allowed to acquire or merge with another company if the resulting
consolidated liabilities exceed 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities
of all financial companies at the end of the year.88 After considering the
significant costs and additional regulatory requirements imposed on SIFIs
after their designation, it is easy to see why a nonbank financial company
might oppose being designated as systemically important.
80. Why the Fed’s Stress Tests Aren’t Credible, BLOOMBERG VIEW (June 22, 2016, 7:30 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-22/why-the-fed-s-stress-tests-aren-t-credible.
81. Id.
82. The effect would harm “many of a bank’s counterparties at once, magnifying losses many
times over.” Id.
83. While the costs and resources associated with the Fed’s stress tests are significant, the
penalties for failing these tests are not. Morgan Stanley was the only major bank to fail the stress
test in 2016, yet it received no fines or penalties, but only needs to resubmit its plan by the end of
the year. Deutsche Bank and Santander, which have also failed the stress tests two and three years
in a row were also not forced to pay any fines or add capital. See Stephen Gandel, Why the Bank
Stress Tests Don’t Really Matter, FORTUNE (July 2, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/02/fed-bankstress-tests/. If the stress tests are as significant as the Fed portrays them to be, why are there no
penalties associated with failing the tests? Perhaps the Fed feels that fear of a tarnished reputation
(if that) is a sufficient incentive to push the companies to pass the tests. But if that is not a real
incentive, and the Fed will not impose any penalties on a company who fails, where is the
importance in expending significant time, money, and effort in preparing for these tests?
84. POTENTIAL IMPACT, supra note 74, at 8.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 8–9.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id.
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Companies may choose to significantly alter their business operations in
an attempt to have their SIFI designation rescinded, and FSOC annually
reevaluates each of its previous designations to account for these changes and
potentially rescind designations as it sees fit.89 GE Capital (GE) was
designated a nonbank SIFI until June 2016, at which time FSOC agreed to
rescind GE’s designation after the company drastically altered its size.90 At
the end of 2014, GE had $500 billion in assets;91 in 2015, in an effort to
significantly shrink its operations, the company devised a plan to sell
approximately $260 billion worth of those assets.92 GE sold a number of its
businesses, including vehicle-fleet financing, commercial real estate,
restaurant lending, and online banking.93 The plan was to sell these assets by
the end of 2017, but GE was able to get it done a year ahead of schedule.94 In
June 2016, in light of GE’s reduced size and assets, FSOC voted to rescind
the company’s SIFI designation.95 GE’s executives have indicated that this
decision allows the company to add around $20 billion of new debt, which
creates the opportunity for stock buybacks and company acquisitions.96 GE
was the first nonbank SIFI to shrink its operations in order to rid itself of its
designation.97
While companies can adjust their operations and dispose of assets as GE
did, there are other methods available for challenging a SIFI designation.
Companies may appear before FSOC prior to its vote on a proposed
designation, may contest their designations during annual reevaluation, and
may request an evidentiary hearing before FSOC to challenge their
designations.98 Still, some companies may choose to accept their SIFI
designation and not challenge it at all. For example, AIG elected not to
contest its designation after FSOC notified it in 2013.99 In fact, in a public
statement issued immediately following FSOC’s proposed designation, AIG

89. See Designations FAQs, supra note 57, at 4–5.
90. See Designations, supra note 33.
91. Ted Mann & Ryan Tracy, GE Capital Sheds ‘Systemically Important’ Label, WALL ST. J.

(June 29, 2016, 7:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-capital-sheds-systemically-importantlabel-for-too-big-to-fail-firms-1467205963.
92. Ted Mann & Emily Glazer, GE to Sell Commercial Lending, Leasing Businesses to Wells
Fargo, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2015, 12:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-to-sell-commerciallending-leasing-businesses-to-wells-fargo-1444742310.
93. Rick Clough, GE Says Too-Big-To-Fail Exit Puts Stamp of Approval on Overhaul,
BLOOMBERG (Jun. 29, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-29/gewins-regulatory-approval-to-shed-too-big-to-fail-designation.
94. Mann & Tracy, supra note 91.
95. GE CAPITAL HOLDINGS, supra note 35, at 7–9.
96. See Mann & Tracy, supra note 91; see also Clough, supra note 93.
97. Mann & Tracy, supra note 91.
98. See Designations FAQs, supra note 57; see also William Butler, Falling on Deaf Ears: The
FSOC’s Evidentiary Hearing Provides Little Opportunity to Challenge a Nonbank SIFI
Designation, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 663, 671 (2014).
99. See generally AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 58.
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stated that the company did not contest the designation, “and welcomes it.”100
Following the heat AIG faced after the 2008 financial crisis, it comes as no
surprise that the company would be hesitant to publicly challenge any
additional regulation. Still, the opportunity to challenge the designation is
available to AIG, should it decide to pursue that route. Other companies, such
as Prudential, have challenged their SIFI designation from the beginning.
Immediately following FSOC’s proposed designation of Prudential as a SIFI
in June 2013, Prudential exercised its right to request a hearing.101 The
company submitted written materials and the hearing was held in July
2013.102 Ultimately, despite Prudential’s challenge, FSOC voted to make the
determination final.103 Another method available to challenge SIFI
designations is a civil suit against FSOC,104 and MetLife is the first of the
nonbank SIFIs to utilize this method.105
In trying to determine what constitutes a fair forum for challenging
designations, it is important to consider the methods employed in the past.
All of the nonbank SIFI designations challenged before FSOC have been
unsuccessful. GE had its SIFI label rescinded only after reducing the size of
the company and its assets. MetLife was able to rescind its designation only
by bringing suit against FSOC in federal district court. There should be a
fairer way for companies to challenge and seek review of their SIFI
designations, without requiring them to dilute their businesses in an effort to
avoid a SIFI label, or to use up judicial resources challenging a designation.
IV. METLIFE, INC. V. FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL
On July 16, 2013, FSOC notified MetLife that the company was being
considered for nonbank SIFI designation.106 Between September 2013 and

100. AIG (AIG) Will Not Contest SIFI Designation, STREETINSIDER (July 9, 2013, 5:17 PM),
http://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/AIG+(AIG)+Will+Not+Contest+SIFI+Designatio
n/8486665.html.
101. See U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013), https:/
/www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Dodd-Frank Section 113(h) provides that a nonbank financial company designated as
systemically important may, within thirty days of the final determination, bring an action in the U.S.
district court for the district in which the home office of the nonbank SIFI is located, or in the U.S.
district court for the District of Columbia, for an order requiring that the designation be rescinded.
The court’s review is limited to whether the final determination made was arbitrary and capricious.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(h) (2012).
105. See Andrew Zajac, Ian Katz & Zachary Tracer, MetLife Sues Over Too-Big-To-Fail Label
by Regulators, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 13, 2015, 5:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-01-13/metlife-sues-over-too-big-to-fail-designation-by-u-s-regulators.
106. U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S
FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
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September 2014, MetLife representatives met with FSOC staff twelve times
and provided over 21,000 pages of documentary material for evaluation.107
Despite MetLife’s efforts, on September 4, 2014, FSOC voted to make a
proposed SIFI designation for MetLife and held a hearing on November 3,
2014, where MetLife was allowed to submit additional materials on its
behalf.108 On December 18, 2014, FSOC voted 9-to-1 to designate MetLife
as a nonbank SIFI under Dodd-Frank.109
Section 113(h) of Dodd-Frank provides that a designated company may
seek judicial review “in the United States district court for the judicial district
in which the home office of such nonbank financial company is located, or
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.”110 The district
court may then dismiss the action or “direct the final determination to be
rescinded.”111 MetLife brought suit in the federal District Court for the
District of Columbia, on the grounds that FSOC’s final determination was
“arbitrary and capricious,” and the District Court rescinded the
designation.112
The District Court’s rescission of MetLife’s SIFI designation was based
on the grounds that “FSOC made critical departures from two of the standards
it adopted in its guidance,” and that “FSOC purposefully omitted any
consideration of the cost of designation to MetLife”—making the designation
arbitrary and capricious under the most recent Supreme Court precedent.113
While the court acknowledged that “[a]n initial agency interpretation is not
instantly carved in stone,” an agency must “acknowledge and explain the
reasons for a changed interpretation.”114
MetLife’s first contention in its suit was that FSOC violated its own
Guidance by failing to assess the company’s vulnerability to material
financial distress before addressing the potential effect of that distress, when
the Guidance said that FSOC would do so.115 The Guidance created two
groups of factors that would be used in determining a nonbank SIFI
designation. The first group (size, substitutability, and interconnectedness)
was meant “to assess the potential impact of the nonbank financial
company’s financial distress on the broader economy,” while the second
group (leverage, liquidity, risk, and maturity mismatch) was meant “to assess
the vulnerability of a nonbank financial company to financial distress.”116
fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf
[hereinafter
METLIFE
DESIGNATION].
107. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 229 (D.D.C. 2016).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 230.
113. Id. (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)).
114. Id. at 233 (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 636 (D.C.C. 2014)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 234.
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The second group was intended to assess a company before it became
distressed, and the first group was intended to assess the impact of such
distress on the country’s financial stability.117 However, in its final
determination of MetLife’s SIFI status, FSOC provided that all six categories
were meant only “to assess the potential effects of a company’s material
financial distress,” and the court found this to be inconsistent with FSOC’s
Guidance.118
FSOC’s second departure from its Guidance surrounds its statement that
“a nonbank financial company could only threaten U.S. financial stability ‘if
there would be an impairment of financial intermediation or of financial
market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to inflict significant
damage on the broader economy.’”119 MetLife argued that because FSOC
never projected any estimated losses, it “never established a basis for a
finding that MetLife’s material financial distress would ‘materially impair’
MetLife counterparties within the meaning of [the Guidance],” and the
District Court agreed.120 The District Court agreed that FSOC never projected
what the losses would be in the event of MetLife’s insolvency, which
financial institutions would be affected as a result, or how the market would
be destabilized.121 The District Court further stated that a “[p]redictive
judgment must be based on reasoned predictions,”122 and provided that “a
summary of exposures and assets is not a prediction.”123
Furthermore, FSOC ignored the costs to MetLife associated with a SIFI
designation. While FSOC is not required under Dodd-Frank to perform a
cost-benefit analysis in making a SIFI determination, the District Court
concluded that failing to consider the costs to MetLife was arbitrary and
capricious.124 In the most recent relevant case—Michigan v. EPA—the
Supreme Court held that “agency action is lawful only if it rests ‘on a
consideration of the relevant factors,’” and that “an agency may not ‘entirely
fail to consider an important aspect of the problem’ when deciding whether
regulation is appropriate.”125 The Supreme Court held that “cost must be
balanced against benefit because ‘[n]o regulation is “appropriate” if it does
significantly more harm than good.’”126 Since FSOC refused to consider cost
in its determination, it was impossible to determine whether the designation

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)).
Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
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“does significantly more harm than good,” thereby rendering the decision
arbitrary and capricious.127
V. METLIFE’S IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER NONBANK SIFIS,
FUTURE DESIGNATIONS, AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
Challenging SIFI designations with legal action in federal district court
is arguably much more effective than appearing before FSOC in an
evidentiary hearing. One of the main questions presented by MetLife’s
challenge (and victory in district court) is whether the remaining nonbank
SIFIs (AIG and Prudential) will follow suit, challenging their own
designations in the same way.128 It is likely that both companies may wait
until the MetLife appeal is decided to determine their next steps. Should the
decision be reversed, the nonbank SIFIs may choose to keep their
designations and challenge them before FSOC upon their annual
reassessment. If the decision is affirmed, AIG and Prudential may very well
end up filing their own suits against FSOC on the same grounds as MetLife.
If Prudential and AIG keep their SIFI labels and MetLife’s rescission is
upheld, the companies may find themselves at a disadvantage, having to
compete with a company that doesn’t face the same regulatory restrictions
they do.129 This may serve as incentive enough to compel Prudential and AIG
to challenge their designations also.
It is likely that AIG’s and Prudential’s shareholders will push for the two
companies to follow MetLife’s lead and challenge their SIFI designations in
federal court. The companies’ stock prices are likely to increase with the
rescission of the SIFI label,130 and funds currently reserved for the enhanced
regulatory costs could be allocated elsewhere. Carl Icahn, a billionaire
investor with a stake in AIG, has recently been pushing AIG to get “smaller
and simpler” in an attempt to lose its designation.131 He said recently that
AIG’s CEO should break the company into three separate insurers to help

127. MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 241. FSOC filed an appeal on March 20, 2016 to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Oral arguments for the appeal were held on October 24, 2016. As
of the publication of this Note, the appeal has not yet been decided.
128. See Ely Razin, Will Prudential, AIG Follow MetLife’s Model to Fight ‘Too Big To Fail’
Tag? There is Another Option, FORBES (Apr. 13, 2016, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/elyrazin/2016/04/13/will-prudential-aig-follow-metlifes-model-to-fight-too-big-to-fail-tagthere-is-another-option/#4fe507414f9e.
129. See id.
130. MetLife’s stock increased 5.1% immediately following the District Court’s decision to
rescind MetLife’s SIFI label. Tomi Kilgore, MetLife’s Stock Jumps in Active Trade After Judge
Rescinds SIFI Designation, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 30, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.marketwatch.
com/story/metlifes-stock-jumps-in-active-trade-after-judge-rescinds-sifi-designation-2016-03-30.
131. Jeff Cox, Why AIG, Prudential Could Face Shareholder Pressure, CNBC (June 1, 2016,
12:54 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/06/01/why-aig-prudential-could-face-shareholder-pressure
.html.
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avoid SIFI status.132 While significantly decreasing operations and selling
assets is clearly one effective way of shedding a SIFI label (the method
successfully utilized by GE133), a company shouldn’t have to fear growth and
success because of the costs associated with being designated as systemically
important. If all nonbank financial entities break themselves up solely to
avoid SIFI designations, it serves a purpose completely opposite of wanting
U.S. businesses to thrive and support themselves financially. It’s one thing to
want companies to remain financially stable—it’s another to essentially push
them to rid themselves of assets and diminish growth in an effort to avoid the
exorbitant costs that come with a SIFI label.
It seems counterintuitive to want U.S. businesses to succeed and be able
to support themselves financially, yet force them to expend countless
resources on the enhanced requirements that come with a SIFI designation.
Companies designated as systemically important spend millions of dollars
each year on reporting and annual stress tests alone.134 How can these
nonbank financial companies be expected to remain financially stable when
their resources are being spent preparing for unrealistic “what-if” scenarios?
It is undoubtedly essential for all systemically important companies to have
some sort of plans in place in preparation for the company’s insolvency or
outright failure, but causing companies to spend millions of dollars preparing
for a failure that may never occur is excessive. FSOC and the Fed are going
beyond comprehensive preparation and creating an outright waste of
resources.
Another important consideration resulting from MetLife’s suit is whether
FSOC’s SIFI designation process requires changes. As the District Court
found in MetLife, FSOC employed different standards in its final
determination of MetLife than the standards it provided for in its Guidance,
and it did not consider MetLife’s costs as the result of a SIFI designation
when making its determination.135 Regulatory agencies must be held
accountable for discrepancies between public statements made regarding
how they will analyze and regulate companies and how they actually do so.
If FSOC plans to consider different factors, or to weigh and analyze the same
factors differently, FSOC should be required to issue a new guidance letter
informing companies and their shareholders of these changes.136 On top of
132. Emma Orr & Katherine Chiglinsky, MetLife Victory Could Push AIG, Pru to Fight Systemic
Risk Designations, INSURANCE JOURNAL (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news
/national/2016/03/31/403746.htm.
133. See Mann & Tracy, supra note 91; see also Clough, supra note 93.
134. See Tracy, supra note 76.
135. See MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219, 223 (D.D.C.
2016).
136. The Dodd-Frank Act provides very broad descriptions of what FSOC should use in its
determinations, and it is therefore up to FSOC to provide sufficient information surrounding its
determination process, so that companies can adequately prepare. See 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2)
(2012). Requiring FSOC to create and distribute guidance surrounding its determination process as
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the fact that these corporations are forced to spend millions of dollars each
year in preparing for enhanced regulatory requirements, now the companies
may be focusing on mitigating risks that FSOC no longer considers threats.
Alternatively, companies may be overlooking areas that they feel present
little or no risk, whereas FSOC may be focusing more heavily on these areas
in its SIFI determination process. These inconsistencies add to the waste of
resources created by this enhanced regulation, and prevent a nonbank
financial company from adequately addressing FSOC’s areas of concern and
effectively challenging their designation before FSOC.
Furthermore, Congress should reform Dodd-Frank to require FSOC to
consider cost in its analysis and determination. As set forth in MetLife and by
the Supreme Court, regulation is not appropriate if it does more harm than
good.137 Causing a company like MetLife to spend a significant amount of
funds on reporting, stress tests, compliance tests, and other requirements that
it could instead be using to make investments and expand capital is not only
wasteful, but does the exact opposite of preparing a company for a potential
financial crisis. To ensure a company can withstand a significant financial
setback, the company must have adequate assets and equity available—
diminishing those assets by feeding them into stress testing and reporting
actually makes these companies worse-off.138 FSOC must consider the costs
associated with enhanced regulation as a result of a SIFI designation before
making its designations. Congress should therefore amend Dodd-Frank to
include a cost-benefit analysis requirement prior to a final SIFI
designation.139
Arguably, the most important needs for reform surrounding FSOC’s SIFI
designations are the need for change in FSOC’s hearing process and an
appeal process within the organization. MetLife representatives met with
FSOC staff numerous times during its designation process and presented
FSOC staff with written materials to support its challenge; yet, FSOC still
voted in favor of MetLife’s proposed SIFI designation.140
There are several problems with challenging SIFI designations in
hearings before FSOC. First, companies are not entitled to an oral hearing to
those procedures change will help ensure fairness to all companies being reviewed and efficiency
for both FSOC and the SIFIs when challenges are presented.
137. See MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 240 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)).
138. Citigroup and Bank of America, specifically, have spent “tens of millions of dollars” in
preparing for the Fed’s stress tests, and the stock prices of many large U.S. banks have suffered
because of hesitation and wariness on the part of investors afraid that over-regulation will hinder
the banks’ profitability. Nathaniel Popper & Michael Corkery, Nearly All U.S. Banks Pass Fed’s
Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/business/dealbook/
nearly-all-us-banks-pass-feds-stress-test.html?_r=0.
139. Financial stress alone, due to compliance with the enhanced regulation that comes with a
SIFI label, should not imply that a company should not be designated as a SIFI. The cost-benefit
analysis proposed should weigh both the costs and the hardship the proposed-SIFI will face with
the need for the company to be regulated.
140. See METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 106.
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challenge their designation—companies must request the hearing in writing
and present justification for why the hearing should be granted.141 If FSOC
does not find the company’s justification adequate to require a hearing, the
company has no alternative means of challenging the designation before
FSOC, as a hearing is a company’s only opportunity after proposed
designation to convince FSOC that it does not pose systemic risk.142 This
leaves a federal district court challenge as the only means of having a SIFI
designation reevaluated and possibly rescinded. Additionally, even if the
hearing is granted, FSOC members are not required to attend the hearing,143
and the procedures for presenting information and answering questions are
limited far beyond any limitations present in federal court.144 For example,
while parties in federal court are bound by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in an evidentiary hearing, the hearing clerk has extremely broad
discretion in establishing the procedures for the hearing. The clerk controls
the amount of time a company has to create its challenge and has virtually
unlimited discretion in limiting the use of written materials or the duration of
the hearing.145 Furthermore, FSOC’s hearing procedures do not give
companies any right to obtain data or analysis used by FSOC in making its
determination.146 To resolve these issues, FSOC should amend its internal
hearing procedures to create a fairer and more formal forum for challenging
designations, similar to trial procedures in federal court. Congress should also
create an internal appeal process within the Treasury Department to allow
companies designated as SIFIs to appeal their designation within the
Treasury structure, as an alternative to bringing suit in federal district court.
A. PROPOSED CHANGES TO FSOC’S EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PROCESS
In addition to the significant costs associated with challenging a
designation before FSOC,147 companies have no right to an oral hearing;
companies must request and justify an evidentiary hearing, and FSOC
maintains its discretion regarding whether or not to grant the hearing.148 Even
if the hearing is granted, FSOC members are not required to attend, and they
may select a representative to conduct the hearing on their behalf.149
Furthermore, FSOC’s hearing procedures do not grant companies a right to
discovery regarding the information and analysis used by FSOC in making
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Butler, supra note 98, at 672.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id. at 676.
SIFIs must compile evidence supporting their challenge and justifying rescission of their
SIFI label, which requires both time and effort on the part of the challenging company.
148. Butler, supra note 98, at 671–72.
149. Id. at 673.
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its determination.150 In response to this unfairness, FSOC should amend its
hearing procedures to ensure due process for all companies challenging
designations, and to create the fairest possible forum within the agency.
FSOC’s hearing procedures expressly provide that no rights are created
within those procedures.151 Section 1(b) of the Hearing Procedures provides
that the provisions of the APA governing adjudications required by statute to
be determined on the record, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to the hearings conducted by FSOC.152
This provision alone implies that FSOC’s hearings are arguably not as fair a
forum as federal court. The APA sets forth the procedures for formal
adjudications153 and FSOC should be required to comply with these
guidelines to best ensure both fairness and consistency.
Under its current procedures, a company challenging a proposed SIFI
designation has thirty days from the time of its designation to request a
written or oral evidentiary hearing to contest the designation.154 If granted,
FSOC must hold the hearing within thirty days of the request.155 The purpose
of challenging a proposed designation is for the company to demonstrate that
it would not threaten the financial stability of the U.S. through material
financial distress or “the nature, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the nonbank financial
company.”156 Conducting analyses and compiling data in support of this
contention can require significant time and resources, and thirty days may be
insufficient to adequately prepare evidence demonstrating that the company
does not pose a threat to the country’s financial stability.
A favorable alternative may be an “interval hearing” system, as opposed
to the “continuous hearing” system traditionally followed by courts. In an
interval hearing system, the government presents its case, and the hearing is
then recessed for some time to allow the respondents to prepare an adequate
defense.157 By requiring FSOC to provide detailed information regarding its
determination, as well as the data and analysis FSOC considered in making
that determination, and then providing a sufficient amount of time for
designated companies to prepare a defense, a fairer hearing process would be
created. FSOC should adopt an interval hearing system for its evidentiary
150. Id. at 676.
151. U.S. DEP’T.

OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL HEARING
PROCEDURES FOR PROCEEDINGS UNDER TITLE I OR TITLE VIII OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
fsoc/designations/Documents/FSOC%20hearing%20procedures.pdf
[hereinafter
HEARING
PROCEDURES].
152. Id.
153. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–57 (2012).
154. Butler, supra note 98, at 671.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 669.
157. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 251 (5th
ed. 2006).
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hearings, and the allotted timeframe for companies to prepare a defense
should be increased from thirty days to at least sixty, allowing companies
more time to adequately compile necessary resources and information in
order to prepare a reasonable defense.
When requiring government agencies to hold evidentiary hearings, the
Supreme Court held that consideration of three distinct factors is required to
ensure due process: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the
official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”158 In
considering these factors as applied to FSOC and SIFI designation, the
private interest affected is the designated company’s assets and resources.
There are costs associated with enhanced regulation and costs associated with
challenging the designation as well.159 These costs are significant, as millions
of dollars go into regulatory requirements such as stress testing every year.160
The government’s interest here is the financial stability of the U.S. economy,
an obviously important interest.161 The risk of an erroneous deprivation of a
designated company’s assets and resources, however, is also significant, and
very plausible. If a company is incorrectly designated as a SIFI and adequate
tools are not in place to ensure a fair method for the company to challenge its
designation, that company will spend millions of dollars on complying with
regulatory requirements that it may not actually need to comply with. To
ensure due process, proper measures need to be taken to create a fair forum
for challenging designations, and that can be accomplished by modeling
FSOC’s evidentiary hearings more closely after proceedings in federal
district court.
Another significant shortcoming in FSOC’s evidentiary hearing process
is the lack of possible discovery.162 Civil suits brought in federal and state
court routinely permit pretrial discovery,163 and the advantages of discovery
practice include ensuring fairness to the litigants and preventing “trial by
158. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
159. As previously noted, additional costs that come with a SIFI label include the costs of

preparing for and completing the Fed’s stress tests, as well as additional reporting requirements and
requiring companies to have more available capital. See Tracy, supra note 76. Costs associated with
preparation of a SIFI challenge can include attorney’s fees, the time and resources used to prepare
and compile data, and analysis supporting rescission of the SIFI label.
160. See id.
161. The purpose behind FSOC, the SIFI designation process, and enhanced regulation was
arguably to prevent another U.S. financial crisis such as the one the country experienced in 2008.
See generally About FSOC, supra note 9. This interest cannot be disregarded, as this was likely
Congress’ main reason for creating the Dodd-Frank Act, however, it needs to be balanced against
the private party’s interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319, 335.
162. See Butler, supra note 98, at 676–77.
163. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 157, at 257.
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surprise,” encouraging settlements, and improving the efficiency of the trial
and the quality of the decision.164 The APA does not contain specific
provisions related to discovery and, therefore, many agencies have different
rules regarding discovery.165 Some agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, have adopted broad discovery rules that mirror those in federal
court,166 whereas other agencies provide only limited opportunities for
discovery before a hearing.167 Agencies that limit discovery arguably do so
to prevent costly and time-consuming “discovery wars,”168 but that should
not be a concern regarding companies seeking to rescind a SIFI label.
Companies challenging a SIFI designation arguably want to get their label
rescinded as quickly as possible—it would not make sense for these
companies to drag out the hearing process. Additionally, having the right to
discovery is practically essential in order to successfully challenge a SIFI
label.169
FSOC’s hearing procedures do not provide a right to discovery regarding
the analysis and data that FSOC used in its determination, beyond the
explanation FSOC provides accompanying the notice of proposed
designation.170 These explanations are vague and do not provide specific
information about what exactly FSOC considered in its designation process
or how it reached its determination.171 The letters use terms like “significant
presence” and “highly complex,” but do not necessarily provide the specific
assets or amounts that tipped the scale in favor of a designation.172 To be able
to effectively argue against a determination, the company needs to know the
specific data considered and the analysis used. It is extremely difficult to
argue that a company does not have a “significant presence” in the industry
without knowing exactly what constitutes “significant.” By requiring
discovery and evidence procedures similar to those in federal court,
companies challenging their designations will be able to gather all the
information they need to bring an informed, effective, and well-prepared
challenge. This will not only ensure fairness, but will limit resource waste.
Expending time and money to challenge a broadly defined designation with
little chance of success is wasteful. If companies are going to spend time and
money challenging FSOC, they need to be able to do so with as much
adequate preparation as is fairly possible.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 257–58.
A company challenging a SIFI designation needs to know exactly what factors FSOC
considered in their designation process to effectively challenge the label. Without having access to
FSOC’s analysis and factors considered, a SIFI challenging its label will arguably be unable to
effectively justify rescission of its label, and therefore, discovery is necessary.
170. Butler, supra note 98, at 676.
171. See generally AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 58.
172. See id.
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B. PROPOSED APPEAL PROCESS WITHIN THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
Another safeguard to ensure fairness for challenging SIFI designations is
the creation of an appeal process within the Treasury Department, so that
companies can appeal their challenge within the structure of the agency
before resorting to federal court. Since FSOC is a part of the Treasury
Department,173 Congress should create a mechanism within that agency that
can hear appeals from FSOC’s evidentiary hearings. High-ranking officials
within the Treasury Department are arguably better equipped to review these
decisions and challenges than members of the judiciary, at least in the first
instance. Additionally, companies should have to exhaust all possible
alternatives before bringing suit in federal court, and requiring an appeal
within the agency is a method of ensuring exhaustion.
Members of the Treasury Department may be in a better position to
decide challenges to SIFI designations than federal judges. It is important to
note that FSOC’s Chair is the Secretary of the Treasury Department;174
therefore, he or she should not serve in the new appeal process, as that will
arguably create a conflict of interest. Congress should create a panel of
Treasury Department officials who can hear the challenge and review
evidence from both sides,175 ultimately making a determination as to whether
the designation should stand or be rescinded. There are several offices within
the Treasury Department,176 and panel members can and should come from a
variety of these offices, including the Office of Economic Policy, the Office
of Legislative Affairs, the Office of Public Affairs, Chief Risk, the Office of
the Treasurer, and the Office of Domestic Finance.177 By creating a diverse
panel of impartial Treasury Department officials with widespread knowledge
of finance and the U.S. economy, Congress can ensure a fair group for
hearing appeals challenging SIFI designations. Arguably, these officials will
be better equipped to review and understand the challenges brought before
them than federal judges,178 making it easier for companies to effectively
present the data and analysis being used to contest the challenge.
173. Designations, supra note 33.
174. See About FSOC, supra note 9.
175. Both FSOC and the challenging SIFI should be able to appeal within the Department and be

able to present their arguments and supporting evidence before the panel. This is another reason
why the Treasury officials serving on such proposed panel need to be independent from those
officials serving as members of FSOC.
176. See Organizational Structure, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/
organizational-structure/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Jan. 23, 2017, 4:33 PM).
177. Id.
178. While a federal judge may very well be capable of successfully analyzing and reviewing a
SIFI designation appeal, because the Treasury Department officials who would make up a proposed
appellate panel are arguably experts in this area, they should be exceptionally-equipped to
adequately review and understand the implications of a designation and its rescission and should be
able to make a well-informed decision regarding the appeal. Such experts should be utilized for
their expertise where possible, such as here.
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An important aspect of administrative law that should also be considered
here is the need for exhaustion. When a person or company challenges an
agency action in court while an administrative proceeding is still underway,
the court will usually dismiss the action for failure to exhaust all possible
administrative remedies.179 Since FSOC’s hearing procedures provide that
they are not governed by the APA,180 exhaustion is not required with regard
to FSOC challenges. Companies may choose to bring suit against FSOC
directly in federal court while their evidentiary hearing is pending, or without
even requesting an evidentiary hearing. In that case, the court will not be
required to dismiss the claim for failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies. Creating a fair hearing process with an internal appeal system, and
having both of these governed by the APA, will require companies to exhaust
all remedies prior to bringing action in federal court.181 This will help
conserve judicial resources for cases where they are truly needed.
Furthermore, some of the issues addressed in a SIFI label challenge may be
so broad and encompassing regarding financial stability that the Treasury
Department officials should have the final say in the matter, considering they
make up the part of the U.S. government primarily concerned with preserving
and enhancing the U.S. economy.182
Exhaustion serves several purposes, including preventing regulated
parties from delaying or obstructing the agency’s ability to conduct an
orderly proceeding, giving the court the benefit of the agency’s fact-finding
capacity and expertise in analyzing the factual assertions underlying the
plaintiff’s complaint, and preventing unnecessary judicial relief by requiring
postponement until the end of the administrative proceeding.183 By creating
an internal appeal process within the Treasury Department and requiring
exhaustion of such remedies before an entity may bring suit against FSOC in
federal court, a more robust record will be created that will be beneficial to a
federal court later on, should the case eventually make its way there.
Arguments will have been presented and perfected, and even though this may
essentially remove the need for a company to ultimately bring suit in federal
district court, if they ultimately decide to do so, both parties will have ample
support for their arguments, thus conserving significant time and resources
in both the pretrial and trial stages.

179. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 157, at 391.
180. See HEARING PROCEDURES, supra note 151.
181. Challenging companies will need to request an evidentiary hearing before FSOC and should

they choose to appeal FSOC’s decision after the hearing, they must do so within the agency’s new
internal appeal process before they can sue in federal court or the court will have discretion to
dismiss the action until the internal appeal has been completed.
182. See About, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury
/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Apr. 22, 2016, 2:03 PM).
183. GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 157, at 391–92.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The costs associated with a SIFI designation are significant, and it is
obvious why companies designated as SIFIs have been eager to challenge
such designations. A company may diminish its size and assets in an attempt
to have FSOC rescind its SIFI label. However, if a company does not wish to
decrease its operations, it may utilize two methods to challenge its
designation: requesting an evidentiary hearing before FSOC, and bringing
suit in federal district court. FSOC’s hearing procedures, however, do not
provide the same rights afforded to parties in federal court, and arguably,
these hearings are an unfair forum for challenging SIFI designations.
To ensure fairness for companies challenging SIFI designations, FSOC
should amend its evidentiary hearing procedures to comply with the same
guidelines followed by the federal courts, and should be governed by the
APA. This will create rights to discovery, allow companies more time to
adequately prepare evidence to support their challenges, and require
exhaustion prior to being able to bring a challenge in federal court.
Additionally, Congress should reform Dodd-Frank to create an internal
appeal process within the Treasury Department to allow nonbank SIFIs to
challenge their designations within the agency before a panel of impartial,
experienced Treasury Department officials. Congress should also reform
Dodd-Frank to require a cost-benefit analysis of a SIFI label as part of
FSOC’s designation process, as “[n]o regulation is appropriate if it does
significantly more harm than good.”184
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